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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this study is to examine how factors such as government payments, soil 
productivity ratings, commodity selling price, corn and soybean production, and spatial 
attributes affect cash rental rates. Baseline estimates of the effects of government 
payments on cash rents are determined using a fixed effect, distributed lag model. The 
results of this model are compared to a distributed lag model that incorporates spatial 
effects. A second model estimates the impact of government subsides on farm cost 
structure. This is accomplished estimating a fixed effect, translog cost function that also 
incorporates spatial effects. The data used in the analysis is the Illinois Farm Business 
Farm Management (FBFM) Economic Management Analysis (EMA), containing more 
than five thousand Illinois FBFM clients annually from 1996 to 2001.  
 








The new farm bill was launched into action in spring, 2002. The new legislation calls for 
funds exceeding $67 billion over the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform 
(FAIR) Act base (Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magné). With this level of government 
backing, two questions asked in this study are: (1) do government subsidies capitalize 
into cash rental rates or farmland value?; and (2) do these support measures affect farm-
level demand for inputs vis-à-vis lower total production costs and higher product 
revenue?  
There is a well-developed literature with respect to analysis of the factors 
affecting farmland values in general, and cash rents in particular. Alston used cash rents 
to proxy income from land. Likewise, Lence and Mishra  considered cash rents 
representative of the observed price of land as an input in production. Cash rents are a 
function of several factors such as land productivity, government support programs, 
inflation and interest rates, individual skill and success, and expected commodity market 
prices. For the most part, farmland price models incorporate Melichar’s idea that land 
prices are linked to real growth in payments to land, and to Feldstein’s hypothesis that 
growth in land prices arises from increases in the inflation rate. Turvey summarizes the 
attributes of these classical approaches towards modeling farmland pricing. In general, 
economic rents are estimated by measuring then capitalizing the area below marginal 
revenue and above marginal cost. Marginal revenue is random without income 
stabilization or deficiency payments, and land values are capitalized relative to expected 
marginal revenue. However, with access to government payments, marginal revenue (and 
therefore economic rents) should increase. 2 
Weersink et al.’s analysis of farmland prices in Canada was one of the first 
studies to decompose farmland prices into returns from market income and payments 
from government programs. Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magné separated government 
payments and farm output from net income, allowing different capitalization rates for 
these income sources. They found that Loan Deficiency Payments (LDP) and 
Agricultural Market Transition Act (AMTA) payments increased farmland value by 
$6.55 and $4.39/acre, respectively. But not surprisingly, conservation reserve program 
(CRP) payments decreased land value by $15.15/acre. Roberts, Kirwin, and Hopkins 
found that government assistance under FAIR could increase land values between $6.80 
and $8.20/acre at a 5% discount rate. Lence and Mishra examined the impact of market 
loan assistance, production flexibility contracts (PFC), CRP, and LDP payments on cash 
rents in Iowa from 1997 to 2001. They assumed that cash rents were not impacted 
whether owners or renters received government payments. Their model also assumed that 
total economic rents accrued only to the owners: that it is the present value of cash rents 
that determines farmland price (Turvey). Depending on the discount rate used, Lence and 
Mishra found that the aggregate impact of government assistance significantly increased 
cash rental rates between $2.62/acre and $1.31/acre (for discount rates of 5% and 10%, 
respectively). For PFCs, and assuming a 5% discount rate, farmland values should 
increase between $14.20 and $26.80/acre.  
In lieu of these studies, the effects of government support on farmland prices in 
Illinois between 1996 and 2001 are estimated. The FAIR Act of 1996 was the farm bill 
legislation effective from 1996 to 2002. This legislation created AMTA payments and 
implemented LDPs. Program participants received nearly $7.5 billion in government 3 
subsidies from 1996 to 2002 in Illinois as a result of the FAIR Act. Midwestern farmers 
have tended to use these payments in bidding or negotiating new cash rent leases (Barry, 
Escalante, and Moss). For producers in some counties, cash rents may substantially 
contribute to farm revenue. Farmers producing only corn and soybeans in Central and 
Northern Illinois owned 14 and 21% of land farmed, respectively. In 2000, these 
producers cash rented 43% of their farmland in Northern Illinois and 21% in Central 
Illinois. AMTA payments are derived from a farm’s historical yields, the number of acres 
enrolled in the government program, and a rate set by the FAIR Act. These payments are 
fixed income transfers based on historical production. As such, they are considered 
‘decoupled’ from production. AMTA payments were also scheduled to end in 2002. 
LDP’s are basic price supports that pay on the difference between posted county crop 
prices and loan rates.  
 
Payment Effects on Input Cost Structure: An Extension to the Cash Rent Analysis 
As an extension to the cash rent section of this study, the effects of these instruments are 
also investigated with respect to farm-level input factor demand and product revenue. A 
translog cost function was estimated, including input share equations for fertilizer, 
pesticide, labor, land rent, and product revenue equations for corn and soybean. Next, 
LDP and AMTA payments are included in the cost function and its derivatives, and the 
model was re-estimated. Differences between the baseline factor demand and input-
output price elasticities are compared. This approach is different from the ‘present value’ 
approaches looking at effects of government support on farmland value in that the farm 
cost structure is the primary focus, and any interpretation regarding effects of these 4 
support measures on land values are inferred by way of changes in demand elasticities for 
land. If results from this model are to be extended to farmland policy price analysis, then 
the working assumption behind this approach is that if government support measures 
increase the demand for land, then farmland prices should increase.  
 
The Issue of Spatial Dependence 
Because of the spatial nature of farmland price data, a reasonable conjecture is that 
location matters with respect to farmland price determination, local variations in posted 
county prices, and levels of government payments received. Realization of cash rents or 
grain output for one farm may be a function of cash rents or output realized by 
neighboring farms. Moreover, farmland prices are also likely a function of ‘suburban 
sprawl’ dynamics (Hardie, Narayan, and Gardner). The same kind of spatial effects 
possibly exist with respect to grain production and related input demand, particularly 
when topography or other geographic characteristics are taken into consideration. If there 
is data for these spatially dependent variables, it should be included in the model. There 
are many reasons why neighboring farms or counties may be similar in the Midwest in 
general and Illinois in particular. There is also the likelihood that errors amongst nearby 
observations are negatively or positively correlated in models that use georeferenced 
data. If this is indeed the case, then any regression results based on these relations may be 
improved in terms of precision and efficiency of estimates when spatial dependence or 
autocorrelation is appropriately modeled. 
Spatial dependence is an econometric issue that has recently received attention in 
the real estate literature (Pace and Barry), urban geography (Elhorst), economic growth 5 
studies (Silveira-Neto, Raul, and Azzoni), analysis of precision agriculture technologies 
(Hurley, Malzer, and Kilian; Lambert, Malzer, and Lowenberg-DeBoer), technical 
change and adoption in agriculture (Druska and Horrace; Holloway, Shankur, and 
Rahman), crop insurance (Wang and Zhang), and deforestation (Swinton; Munroe). Some 
farmland price literature in agricultural economics has also used spatial econometric 
approaches (for example, Benirschka and Binkley; Hardie, Narayan, and Gardner; Lence 
and Mishra). These studies recognized that determinants such as local or regional ‘spill-
over’ effects linked to geography, transportation infrastructure, plant pathogen 
epidemiology, or other spatially dependent processes may be important factors 
determining farmland prices or grain output at the farm level. If, for example, data for 
these variables are not directly observable, they may be modeled through spatial 
autoregressive (SAR) parameters using matrices that identify proximity and relative 
importance of spatial relations between observations.  
 
The Objectives of This Study 
The objectives of this study are twofold. The first objective is to examine how AMTA 
and LDP payments affect cash rental rates. The second objective is to determine the 
effect of these government support instruments on farm-level cost structure and 
concomitantly, input demand given input and output price changes. The data used to 
examine the effects of these government programs on cash rental rates and output is a 
panel data set comprising 470 farms representing 74 counties in Illinois between 1996 
and 2001. This data is from a portion of the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management 
(FBFM) Economic Management Analysis (EMA), containing more than five thousand 6 
Illinois FBFM clients annually from 1996 to 2001. Because some survey participants did 
not participate in the survey every year, only 74 counties are used in the analysis. 
Because of the spatial nature of the Illinois FBFM data set used in this analysis, 
diagnostics for spatial autocorrelation was used to detect spatial structure in errors or 
between observations. When spatial structure is present between observations or model 
residuals, a spatial econometric approach can be used to exploit this information.  
 
Empirical Methods 
Three econometric models are developed to test whether AMTA and LDP payments (i) 
significantly increased cash rents on a per acre basis in Illinois between 1996 and 2001; 
and (ii) significantly affected input factor demand and input-output price elasticities over 
the same time period. To test (i), two models are considered: (a) Lence and Mishra’s 
deconstruction of a profit-maximization model developed to specifically evaluate the 
impacts of government payments on farmland values; and (b) following Hausman, Hall, 
and Griliches, a fixed-effect (FE), distributed lag model. The FE model allows for farm-
specific effects in the regression analysis such as the producers’ skill, or other unobserved 
sources of heterogeneity. To test objective (ii), an indirect translog cost function 
(Capalbo) was estimated with and without LDP and AMTA payments. A FE model was 
also specified to capture unobserved production heterogeneity between farms in the 
translog cost model.  
 7 
Spatial Lag and Spatial Error FE Models 
In spatial econometrics, an n x n spatial weights matrix (W) is often used to define 
neighborhoods of observations. By including W  into the regression model, relations 
between the dependent variable yit(or residual uit) with neighboring yjt’s(ujt’s) are defined 
for spatial lag(error) processes. Consider the standard FE model (Wooldridge), yt = xtβ + 
c + ut, where  [] ′ = ′ nt it y y y ,..., t ,  [] ′ = ′ nt it t x x x ,..., ,  [] ′ = ′ n 1 c c ,..., c , ut is a disturbance term, 
and n = 1,…,470 farms and t = 1996,…,2001.  
For spatial lag processes, the FE regression model becomes yt = [RT⊗ W]yt + xtβ 
+ c + ut; where RT is a T x T block diagonal matrix with zeros on the off-diagonals, and 
SAR lag terms ρt for each period in the panel series for explaining dependence of yit on 
neighboring yjt’s. The disturbance term ut is an independent and identically distributed 
(iid), non-heteroskedastic, uncorrelated disturbance term ~N(0, σ
2).  
The FE spatial error model is specified as yt = xtβ + c + εt with 
[] t n T t u ε W Λ ε + ⊗ = t . The error term εt defines a spatial error autoregressive process for 
each period in the panel series. ΛT is a T x T block diagonal matrix with zeros on the off-
diagonals and λt SAR parameters on the diagonal.  
Note that when ΛT = 0 or RT = 0 ordinary least squares (OLS) is the best linear 
unbiased estimator of the FE model. Depending on the assumptions made by the 
researcher, λ or ρ may be constrained to be the same across all periods (for example, 
Lence and Mishra; Elhorst) or separate SAR terms can be estimated for each time period 
(Druska and Horrace; Lambert, Malzer, and Lowenberg-DeBoer; Anselin).  8 
Detecting Spatial Lag or Error in an FE Model 
Moran’s I is sometimes used to test for spatial dependence. However, rejection of the null 
hypothesis of “no spatial dependence” does not provide indication of the type of spatial 
dependence present in the residuals. Instead, Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests can be used 
to identify spatial error or spatial lag processes. The single-equation LM(error) test   
(Anselin) is:   
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where  t t n u u′ =
− 1 2 σ , tr is the trace operator, and LMt is the LM test for spatial error in 
each period t. By extension, a joint LM(error) test for the FE model may be written as: 
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− 1 . Both statistics are  ()
2 ~ T χ  variates.  
Baltalgi, Song, and Koh recently suggested a Standardized LM(error) test (SLM) 
developed specifically for random error component (ECM) models. Their statistic is, by 
extension, modified to account for the unobserved effects included in the FE model. The 
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N – k (modified for the inclusion of fixed effects; T is the number of periods, N is the 9 
number of fixed effects, or farms in the survey, and k is the number of explanatory 
variables), and: 
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2 2 2 + ⊗ − ⊗ × = S S tr tr S d VAR n T n T M W I M W I       (4)   
The SLM test statistic is ~N(0,1). There is presently no spatial lag SLM analogue. 
The alternative of the LM(error) and SLM tests is that residuals follow a spatial 
pattern, while the alternative for the LM(lag) test is that individual observations on 
explanatory and/or the dependant variables are correlated with the average of other values 
of the same variables in a given neighborhood of observations. Rejection of the null for 
the LM(lag) test means that the researcher is faced with an omitted variable problem; FE 
model estimates are biased and inconsistent. If the null of the LM(error) test is rejected, 
the researcher faces an efficiency problem; FE model estimates are not biased, but they 
are inefficient.  
 
Lence and Mishra’s Model Testing Ho: Government Payments do not affect Cash Rental 
Rates 
Lence and Mishra  recently proposed a model to describe how government payments 
affected cash rental rates in Iowa between 1996 and 2001. Their model is important 
becasue it links government payments to economic theory by way of the producer’s 
optimization problem as a function of payment instruments. To determine the effects of 
government payments on cash rental rates, the t-period regression equations including 
spatial effects they propose is (in terms of the variables in this study): 
()
() () () () () 1 , 1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 2 1 , , 1 ,
1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 2 1 , , 1 1 , 0 , 1
+ + − + − + − + − −
+ + + + +
+ − − − −
+ + + + + − =
t i t i LDP LDP t i AMTA AMTA t i soybean t i corn t i
t i LDP LDP t i AMTA AMTA t i soybean t i corn t t i
u z z z z r
z z z z r
λ β λ β λ β λ β λ
β β β β λ β
      (4) 10 
where () ∑ ≠ − ≡
j i t j ij t i r w r , , ,  () ∑ ≠ + + − ≡
j i t i k ij t i k z w z 1 , , 1 , wij is an element in a spatial weights 
matrix, W; t = 1996,…,2001 and i = 1,…,470 farms; λ is a SAR parameter; zcorn and 
zsoybean are revenues from corn and soybean (calculated using real prices); and ui,t+1 is an 
independent and identically distributed (iid) disturbance term for farm i in period t, with 
E[ui,t+1] = 0. The βk’s are restricted to be the same for all t equations. Each of the t 
equations identifies a period in the panel. Insignificant t-values for βAMTA and βLDP would 
suggest that government payments have no effect on cash rental rate. The system of t 
equations is estimated using iterated general method of moments (ITGMM). Details on 
estimation details are found in Lence and Mishra. 
Lence and Mishra restricted the SAR parameter to be identical across all periods. 
Elhorst proposed similar restrictions for panel data sets. Hardie, Narayan, and Gardner 
also assumed identical SAR terms across their analysis of land prices in the Mid-Atlantic 
States. An alternative interpretation of spatial process in panel data sets allows each 
period in the panel series to have its own SAR term (for example, Anselin; Lambert, 
Lowenberg-DeBoer, and Malzer; Druska and Horrace). This makes sense because, 
although spatial proximity between farms and counties are generally invariant, the 
outcome of varying temporal effects over a fixed spatial array may be considerably 
different. Following Lence and Mishra, no diagnostics are used to evaluate residuals 
across the t equations: their model assumes a priori spatial error autocorrelation exists, 
and this is assumed to be the case when applying their model here. A likelihood ratio 
(LR) test is used to determine whether inclusion of period-specific SAR parameters is 
warranted.  11 
  Lence and Mishra also use a different specification of proximity than the one used 
in this study. They used an inverse distance matrix with the typical wij elements 
∑ ≠
− −
j ij ij j i d d ,
δ δ , where the parameter (δ) weights the distance between observations 
(dij) is simultaneously estimated with the model parameters. In this study, a row-
standardized, exogenous contiguity matrix is used because records of Cartesian 
coordinates were not available for individual farms. 
 
Distributed Lag Model Testing Ho: Government Payments do not Affect Cash Rental 
Rates  
The FE distributed lag model used to estimate the effects of AMTA and LDP payments 
on cash rental rates between 1996 and 2001 is a linear version of Hausman, Hall, and 
Griliche’s non-linear FE distributed lag model (Wooldridge): 
ri,t = θt + βAMTAAMTAi,t-1 + βLDPLDPi,t-1 + βcorn revenue (Pcorn*CORNYIELD)i,t  
+ βbean revenue (Psoybeans*BEANYIELD)i,t + βSPRSPRi,t + βACRES OWNEDACRESOWNEDi,t +  
+ βCASH RENTED ACRES CASHRENTACRESi,t  + βSHARE ACRES SHAREACRESi,t  + ci + uit       (5)  
where r is the cash rent acre
-1 for farm i = 1,…,470 in period t = 1997,…,2001; LDP 
($/acre) and AMTA ($/farm) are the government payments received by farm i in the 
previous period; CORNYIELD  and BEANYIELD are the corn and bean yields (bu/acre) 
produced by farm i in period t; Pcorn and Psoybean are the real corn and soybean prices 
received by farm i in period t; ACRESOWNED, CASHRENTACRES, and SHAREACRES 
are the farmed acres that are owned, cash rented, or share-rented by farm i in period t, 
respectively. Finally, ci are unobserved, heterogeneous farm-specific effects (for 
example, the producer’s farming skill); θt is a time-varying intercept; and uit is defined 12 
above. Insignificant t-values for βAMTA and βLDP would suggest that these government 
instruments do not have an effect on cash rental rates.  
 
Indirect Translog Cost Function Testing Ho: Government Payments do not Influence 
Farm-level Factor Demand Elasticities 
An indirect translog cost function is specified to estimate the effects of government 
support on factor demand elasticities and input-output price elasticities:  
ε ϑ
ζ τ η
γ β ϕ ψ α
+ + +
+ + +
+ + + + =
∑ ∑∑
∑∑ ∑ ∑∑
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(6) 
where C are total costs for farm
 i; qi is total corn and soybean yield for farm i (bu); wk are 
input costs/acre for pesticides, fertilizer, labor, and land; dt are time dummy variables (t = 
1997,…,2001), and cf are unobserved, individual farm-specific effects, and ε is a 
disturbance term which may or may not be spatially dependent on other error terms. 
Equation 6 is an approximation of the conventional indirect cost function since input 
levels are not directly observed. For integrability, the interactions between the linear cost 
and quantity terms are multiplied by the fixed effects. The following behavioral, cost-
minimizing restrictions are imposed: homogeneity restrictions;  ∑ ∑ = =
j ij l kl 0 , 0 ϕ γ  and 
an additivity restriction;∑ =
k k 1 β . The homogeneity restrictions imply symmetry in the 
γ and φ matrices. The input share equations (sk) and product revenue equations (Ri) are 
derived using Shepard’s Lemma:  
∑∑ ∑ ∑
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where uk and vi are disturbance terms which may or may not be spatially dependent on 
other uk’s or vi’s. An additional restriction is imposed in the fixed effects parameters; 






f ∈ ∀ = = , ,  because the same, farm-specific heterogeneous effects are 
assumed to operate across all of the equations similarly. 
Because LDP’s are linked to production, corn and soybean product revenues are 
adjusted as () t i t i t i t i
t i LDP
t i C LDP Q P R , 1 , , ,
, ,
, − + = . On the other hand, there are no direct 
linkages between AMTA payments and input or output. To model the effects of AMTA 
payments on farm-level cost structure, AMTA payments enter the indirect cost function 
as an extra term in the intercept; 1 0 0 ln ~
− + = t AMTA δ α α .  
The system of equations is estimated using iterated seemingly unrelated 
regression (ITSUR). Lagrange multiplier tests are used to separately test for spatial 
dependence in each period in each equation. Z-tests are used to statistically compare 
elasticities derived from the cost system with and without LDP and AMTA payments.  
 
Specification of the Spatial Weights Matrices Used in this Analysis 
A spatial weights matrix was constructed to capture farm-farm effects within a given 
county and farm-county links across counties in Illinois. The weight matrix is therefore a 
combination of two spatial contiguity patterns. The first weight matrix identifies farms 
belonging to the same county (W
F); all farms belonging to the same county receive a ‘1’ 
entry in W
F. The second matrix identifies neighboring counties in the dataset based on a 
‘queen’ or a ‘rook’ criterion (
c
Rook W  or 
c
Queen W ). The ‘rook’ criterion identifies counties 14 
whose borders are perpendicular to a given county. The ‘queen’ criterion identifies 
counties whose borders are perpendicular and diagonal to a given county. A visual 
analogy would be that of the moves rooks or the queen pieces take on a chessboard. 
Neighboring counties of a given county receive a ‘1’ entry in this matrix according to the 
‘queen’ or ‘rook’ criterion. 
c
Rook W , 
c
Queen W , and W
F are row standardized. After combining 
the farm-farm and farm-county matrices as W
R = 
c








Q) are row standardized.  
Druska and Horrace interpret the weighting matrices used in their farm technical 
efficiency analysis as a mechanism that models production shocks of farm i as a function 
of productivity shocks experienced by neighboring farms j. Lence and Mishra interpret 
their weighting matrix as a mechanism to capture error correlation across counties in their 
study of farmland prices in Iowa. A similar interpretation from both of these studies is 
applicable here, but the shocks not only capture localized effects (for instance, farms 
located in the same county), they capture other effects that operate at the inter-county 
level (for example, effects attributable to water-shed drainage, regional soil types, 
similarities in posted inter-county crop prices, local competition, or weather patterns). 
 
General Moments Estimation of the Spatial Error FE Model (SARE-GM)  
Elhorst outlines the estimation steps of the spatial FE model using maximum likelihood 
(ML). Kelejian and Prucha proposed an alternative method for estimating the spatial 
autoregressive model that does not require estimation of eigenvalues of Wn or the log 
determinant, () n n W Λ I T ⊗ − ln , greatly decreasing computation time. Druska and Horrace 
modified Kelejian and Prucha’s approach to accommodate FE models. The approach they 15 
used is employed here to estimate the spatial error FE model. The following system of 
general moment equations solves for λt for a single equation in period t:  
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  The moment conditions are solved, and the slope estimates are found conditional 
upon the λt’s as  ()Y Ω X X Ω X β
* & & & & & & & & ′ ′ =
− 1
, () QX W Λ I X n T nT ⊗ − = & & , () QY W Λ I Y n T nT ⊗ − = & & , 
where the time de-trending matrix () T diag nT nT nT ι ι I Q ′ − = , Λ is a T x T matrix of zeros 
with diagonal elements λt, and ι is a vector of ones. Druska and Horrace use a weighting 
matrix n
2
T I σ Ω ⊗ =
−  because the SARE FE error model is, by construction, 
heteroskedastic. 
 
Instrumental Variable Estimation of the Spatial Lag FE Model (SARL-IV) 
The spatial lag model can be estimated using an instrumental variable (IV) approach 
(Lee). In the first stage of this approach, the spatially lagged dependent variable (Wy) is 
regressed on the set of dependent variables (X), the lagged and squared lagged values of 
the explanatory variables (WX and W
2X). In the second stage, the predicted values of Wy 
are included in equations 5, or 6, 7, and 8. The spatial lag AR parameters (ρ) explain the 16 
correlation between observation yi and surrounding yj neighbors. Explanatory and 
endogenous variables are time-detrended with the Q matrix for fixed effect estimation.     
 
Diagnostics for Spatial Autocorrelation 
Lence-Mishra Cash Rent Model 
There are no diagnostics for the Lence-Mishra model because it is assumed a priori there 
is spatial error dependence. 
 
Distributed Lag Cash Rent Model 
The LM test for spatial error was significant for the ‘queen’ and ‘rook’ weight 
specifications (LM(error) = 12.07 and 11.36, respectively; LM critical value = 11.07 at 
the 5% level). The SLM test was also significant for ‘queen’ and ‘rook’ weight 
specifications (SLM = 5.08 and 4.95, respectively, Z critical value = 1.96 at the 5% 
level). Spatial lag was not detected in the residual terms when ‘queen’ or ‘rook’ weight 
specifications were used (LM(lag) = 7.83 and 7.56, respectively). Based on these 
diagnostics, equation 5 was re-estimated using SARE-GM adjusted for fixed effects. 
 
Translog Cost Model 
The LM(lag) tests for the indirect cost function, the input share equations, and the corn 
and soybean revenue equations were highly significant (Table 2). LM(error) tests also 
indicated the presence of spatial error, but the magnitude compared to the LM(lag) results 
was much less. Similar results obtained when LDP and AMTA payments were included 17 
in the cost system. Based on these results, the translog cost model with and without 
government payments was re-estimated using the SARL-IV approach. 
 
Regression Results and Analyses 
Lence-Mishra Cash Rent Model 
The Lence-Mishra model was estimated restricting SAR terms to zero, using a single 
SAR term, and allowing each period to have a SAR coefficient. Although the coefficients 
of determination were very low, AMTA and LDP payments significantly increased cash 
rents in each of the specifications (Table 3). However, the coefficient for corn revenue 
was negative when the SAR terms were restricted to be zero and when a single SAR term 
was used for the entire series. When each period was allowed a separate SAR term, the 
expected signs for revenue were obtained for corn and soybean. SAR terms were 
significant in 3 of the 5 years. The null hypothesis of no spatial error autocorrelation 
across all periods was rejected at the 5% level (likelihood ratio test, LR = 33, df = 5). 
LDPs increased cash rent $2.34/acre at a 5% discount rate, based on the estimates for the 
model allowing a SAR term for each period (estimated as  δ β t Govtpaymen , where δ is a 
discount rate, Turvey). These results for LDPs are similar in magnitude to those found in 
the Lence-Mishra study. AMTA payments positively contributed to cash rents, but at a 
magnitude much less than that of LDPs ($0.006/acre).   
 
Distributed Lag Cash Rent Model 
It is worth noting that ordinary least squares(OLS) results are generally in agreement with 
(although not the same magnitude as) the Lence-Mishra results: AMTA and LDP 18 
payments significantly increase farmland values (Table 4).  The null hypothesis of ‘no 
fixed effects’ was rejected at the 5% level (F = 3.96, numerator df = 470, denominator df 
= 1863), indicating that a FE specification is appropriate with this panel series. When 
individual, farm-level heterogeneity is permitted, the effect-magnitude of AMTA and 
LDPs decreases, and the effects are no longer significant. 
In general, the results of the FE model estimated with SARE-GM were not 
different from the ordinary FE estimates. AMTA and LDP payments still positively (but 
insignificantly) impact farmland value ($0.0045 and $3.50/acre, respectively, 5% 
discount rate).  
Considering the Lence-Mishra and the Distributed Lag model results, the 
relatively small magnitude of the effects of AMTA payments may not be surprising. 
AMTA payments were scheduled to terminate by 2002. If producers considered these 
payments to be transitory compared to income from the market, government payments as 
an income source will be discounted more heavily than income received from selling 
grain (Weersink et al.). If this is true, then the expected impact of transitory government 
payments on farmland prices should be minimal. 
 
Translog Cost Model 
Model fit statistics for the translog cost model estimated with and without AMTA and 
LDP payments were similar (Table 5). It is difficult to generalize a trend with respect to 
changes in the parameters estimated with and without LDP and AMTA payments. 
However, there are some differences between estimates including government payments, 
and those that do not (Table 6). 19 
The biggest difference is apparent in corn and soybean output intercept 
coefficients (ψ) in the revenue equations. This is not surprising because LDPs are added 
to corn and soybean product revenue when the model is estimated with government 
payments. As expected, the AMTA slope coefficient (δ) is negative (and significant). All 
of the spatial lag terms (ρ) were bounded between –1 and 1.  
All inputs substitute for one another given respective price changes. Input own- 
and cross-price elasticities were inelastic, while factor demand elasticities with respect to 
corn and soybean output were elastic (Table 7). The greatest change in factor demand 
with respect to a 1% increase in corn output was observed with the demand for labor 
(2.24%). For soybean, after including AMTA and LDPs, the demand for land increases 
by 1.55% given a 1% increase in soybean output.  
AMTA and LDP payments significantly impact the magnitude of the factor 
demand and input-output price elasticities (Table 7). Own-price elasticities for fertilizer, 
pesticide, and land are significantly different when AMTA and LPDs are included in the 
cost model. It is interesting to note too that the own-price elasticity for land and the cross-
price elasticities between land and the other inputs are significantly different from the 
base (without payment) elasticities. This is to be expected because the land cost share 
(46%) is twice as large as cost shares for fertilizer, pesticides, and labor (19%, 16%, and 
19%, respectively). Like the factor demand elasticies, input-output elasticities were 
significantly different when the cost model was estimated with and without AMTA and 
LDP payments. The greatest changes compared to the base were observed with labor 
demand, given a 1% increase in soybean output, and demand for land, given a 1% 
increase in corn output.    20 
The mechanism driving the changes in factor demands given an increase in output 
is clear for LDP payments, coupled with the cost burden of land representing 46% of the 
total costs. These payments directly enter the product revenue terms for corn and 
soybean. If corn (or soybean) output were to increase, and LDPs are concomitantly 
received for corn (or soybean), then the producer has incentive to purchase more inputs to 
increase production of these crops. The biggest boost in factor demand after government 
payments are included in farm cost structure comes from a change in corn output, 
followed by an increase in demand for land. This might be expected because corn yield is 
generally higher than soybean yield, and that land supply is, in the short run at least, 
fixed.  
The story is slightly different considering changes in soybean output, factor 
demand, and LDP payments. Fertilizer, pesticide, and labor demand significantly increase 
by about 0.2% with the addition of support payments. However, demand for land 
decreases less. This might be attributable to the corn-soybean rotation pattern generally 
observed throughout the Midwest. Because corn is historically the dominant crop in 
Illinois, many producers may consider it the ‘decision’ crop; soybean cycles generally 
follow corn. 
The role of AMTA payments in these changes is less clear. As a sensitivity check, 
the translog cost model was estimated adding only LDP payments. The results were not 
significantly different from the present results, indicating that, based on the assumptions 
maintained here about how government payments enter farm production costs, LDP 
payments seem to be driving changes in factor demand-output relations. Alternative 21 
specifications might model land rent as a price expectation model with lagged AMTA 




While it has been long known that government subsidies tend to be capitalized into land 
farmland values and cash rental rates, these results indicated there are no changes in cash 
rental rates could be attributed to AMTA or LDP payments, assuming that the FE model 
is the correct specification. One explanation is that because the 1996 FAIR act was a 
continuation of previous farm legislation subsidies, farmland cash rental rates were 
already artificially inflated from older farm bills. If during the FAIR act years, 
government subsidies ceased then this study may have documented decreases in cash 
rental rates. While this is one explanation, it is not surprising that slight changes in 
replacement farm legislation would significantly change land values and rents that have 
been affected by subsidies for several decades.  
However, cost structure is affected by LDP and AMTA payments with respect to 
land and the substitute inputs; fertilizer, labor, and pesticides. The substitution effect 
towards other inputs away from land is significantly less in the presence of these 
instruments. This suggests that farmers place more importance on land in terms of 
production than marginal dollars spent on alternative inputs when payments are available. 
Input use with respect to output elasticities are also much greater in magnitude with corn 
compared to soybeans. This suggests that farmer’s input decision making is driven by the 
corn portion of the rotation. Additionally, input-output elasticities appear to significantly 
increase with payments for corn and soybeans.  22 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics covering farms used in the study: 1996-2001 
Variable Mean  Std  10
th percentile  90
th percentile 
Cash rent ($ acre
-1)  119 45  71 154 
Corn price ($ bu
-1)  2.80 0.37 2.37 3.24 
Soybean price ($ bu
-1)  6.43 1.07 5.37 7.83 
Soybean revenue ($ acre
-1)  313 73 238  413 
Corn revenue ($ acre
-1)  423 83 324  523 
Corn yield (bu acre
-1)  151 24 120  179 
Soybean yield (bu acre
-1)  49 7 40  57 
Owned acres   173  246  0  440 
Shared acres   418  457  0  979 
Cash rented acres  413  369  88  815 
LDP ($ acre
-1)  68 30 19 95 
AMTAF ($ farm
-1) 15966  11407  6448  26697 
      
 
 
Table 2. Lagrange multiplier tests for spatial lag and error in the translog cost 
model 
  Without Payments  With Payments 
  LM(error)*
,** LM(lag)  LM(error)  LM(lag) 
Total  Cost  263 1899 253  895 
Fertilizer Share Eq.  101  1143  97  1040 
Pesticide  Share  Eq.  37 181 38 158 
Labor  Share  Eq.  32 775 32 808 
Bean Revenue Eq.  1150  10484  1329  11370 
Corn Revenue Eq.  1597  10674  2146  12230 
*5% Critical level for LM(lag) and LM(error) tests is 11.07; **The results using the 
‘queen’ matrix are presented here. In all cases, rejection was stronger using the ‘queen’ 
weights. 
 
Table 3. Parameter estimates using Lence and Mishra’s GMM spatial model 
Parameter  Estimate T Estimate T Estimate T 
λ     0.0086  0.46    
λ(97)       -0.0222  -1.12 
λ(98)       0.1818  3.90 
λ(99)       0.0600  1.45 
λ(00)       0.2341  5.12 
λ(01)       0.4955  10.03 
Constant    97  108.2559 66.34 108.1704 65.94 104.7415 62.17 
Constant    98  109.6168 64.91 109.5734 63.89 107.2765 54.21 
Constant  99  103.2691  47.57  103.4370  46.23  99.6808  40.81 
Constant    00  104.7231 45.89 104.9343 44.26 102.6290 37.35 
Constant    01  105.0438 44.25 105.2895 42.47 112.4214 29.78 
βcorn  -0.00468 -1.30  -0.0052  -1.40  0.0011  0.30 
βsoy  0.025093  6.25 0.0260 6.31 0.0224 5.34 
βamta  0.000216  5.43 0.0002 5.43 0.0003 7.05 




Table 3 (continued). Parameter estimates using Lence and Mishra’s GMM spatial 
model 
 
Table 4. Farm-level, cash rented acres distributed lag model (Standard Errors in 
parentheses). Dependent variable is cash rent acre
-1 
Variable  OLS  FEM  FEM GMM SAR 
Intercept  -6.480 53.130 49.820 
  (7.714) (57.750) (50.037) 
AMTA(t-1)  0.001* 1.000E-04  1.906E-04 
  (1.858E-04) (3.448E-04)  (2.239E-04) 
LDP(t-1)  0.320* 0.150  0.175 
  (0.129) (0.118)  (0.102) 
Soybean revenue  0.026 0.004  0.005 
  (0.020) (0.017)  (0.016) 
Corn revenue  0.060* 0.030*  0.023 
  (0.015) (0.017)  (0.014) 
Soil Productivity  1.170* 0.530  0.567 
  (0.085) (0.624)  (0.547) 
Owned acres  0.004 0.084* 0.080* 
  (0.005) (0.016)  (0.014) 
Cash rented acres  -0.010* -0.030*   -0.028* 
  (0.003) (0.009)  (0.007) 
Share rented acres  -0.001 0.021* 0.019* 
  (0.003) (0.008)  (0.007) 
Time dummy(1998)  -7.230* -0.440  1.057 
  (3.242) (3.385)  (3.940) 
Time dummy(1999)  -14.020* -6.120  -4.519 
  (3.749) (3.600)  (3.949) 
Time dummy(2000)  -31.210* -13.470  -12.536 
  (10.369) (9.621)  (8.782) 
Time dummy(2001)  -31.330* -13.240  -13.472 
  (11.393) (10.592)  (9.523) 
      
Spatial AR coefficients**      
λ(97)     0.50 
λ(98)     0.15 
λ(99)     0.21 
λ(00)     0.27 
λ(01)     0.33 
Adjusted R
2 0.19  0.60  0.61 
*Significant at the 5% level; **Standard errors are not reported for SARE-GM since they 
are not estimable (Kelejian and Prucha). 
 
        
Equation -----------------------------------------------Adjusted  R
2------------------------------------------------ 
1997   0.0019    0.0028    0.0008 
1998   0.0190    0.0197    0.0423 
1999   0.0231    0.0229    0.0276 
2000   0.0112    0.0115    0.0343 
2001   0.0250    0.0255    0.0525 24 
Table 5. Translog model fit statistics 
  Root Mean Squared Error  Squared Correlation Coefficient 
Equation  No Payments  Payments  No Payments  Payments 
ln Cost  0.3976  0.4116  0.9272  0.9289 
Fertilizer share  0.0533  0.0528  0.9578  0.9568 
Pesticide share  0.0485  0.0508  0.9389  0.9348 
Labor share  0.0616  0.0651  0.9546  0.9516 
Soybean revenue  1.5454 1.6302  0.9966  0.9973 
Corn revenue  1.0885  1.1831  0.9968  0.9970 
 
 
Table 6. Fixed effect, translog cost model estimates with and without AMTA and 
LDP payments* 
Parameter  Estimate T Estimate T 
  Without LDP and AMTA Payments  With LDP and AMTA Payments 
α0  2.6945 59.88 2.9740 69.29 
δAMTA     -0.0039  -2.07 
ψbean  0.1948 5.38 0.2300 6.44 
ψcorn  0.5139 13.56 0.5093 13.61 
φbean, bean  0.0306 33.06 0.0291 32.01 
φbean, corn  0.0212 6.59 0.0208 6.53 
φcorn, corn  -0.0131 -1.92 -0.0114 -1.70 
βfertilizer  0.0540 5.23 0.0700 6.85 
βpesticide  0.0488 5.28 0.0529 5.79 
βlabor  0.3491 31.11 0.3331 30.10 
βland  0.5482 66.34 0.5440 65.89 
γfertilizer, fertilizer  0.0045 15.46 0.0034 12.05 
γfertilizer, pesticide  -0.0065 -14.00 -0.0065 -13.95 
γfertilizer, labor  0.0057 14.25 0.0055 13.63 
γfertilizer, land  -0.0037 -8.66 -0.0024 -5.48 
γpesticide, pesticide  0.0037 15.49 0.0031 13.38 
γpesticide, labor  0.0035 8.20 0.0032 7.32 
γpesticide, land -0.0007  -1.98  0.0001  0.39 
γlabor, labor  0.0004 2.20 0.0003 1.81 
γlabor, land  -0.0096 -20.98 -0.0089 -19.45 
γland, land  0.0141 77.82 0.0112 64.70 
ηbean, fertilizer  0.0020 1.18 0.0017 0.98 
ηbean, pesticide   0.0022 1.54 0.0020 1.40 
ηbean, labor  -0.0014 -0.77 -0.0013 -0.72 
ηbean, land  -0.0028 -2.16 -0.0024 -1.78 
ηcorn, fertilizer  0.0126 6.90 0.0118 6.48 
ηcorn, pesticide  0.0123 7.94 0.0129 8.31 
ηcorn, labor  -0.0121 -6.17 -0.0097 -4.96 













Table 6 (continued). Fixed effect, translog cost model estimates with and without 
AMTA and LDP payments* 
      
Spatial  Lag  Coefficients      
ρ(Cost,  1997)  -0.0010 -0.23 -0.0035 -0.87 
ρ(Cost,  1998)  0.2641 1.44 0.2537 1.50 
ρ(Cost,  1999)  0.1742 0.83 0.1625 0.83 
ρ(Cost,  2000)  0.2256 2.10 0.1881 1.89 
ρ(Cost,  2001)  -0.0375 -1.79 -0.0283 -1.52 
ρ(Fertilizer,  1997)  -0.0026 -1.10 -0.0036 -1.60 
ρ(Fertilizer,  1998)  -0.0070 -2.93 -0.0075 -2.94 
ρ(Fertilizer,  1999)  -0.0056 -0.07 -0.0152 -0.17 
ρ(Fertilizer,  2000)  0.1719 1.52 0.1619 1.38 
ρ(Fertilizer,  2001)  0.0311 0.48 0.0433 0.63 
ρ(Pesticide,  1997)  -0.0157 -0.88 -0.0130 -0.67 
ρ(Pesticide,  1998)  -0.0030 -0.13 -0.0078 -0.30 
ρ(Pesticide,  1999)  -0.0066 -3.43 -0.0059 -2.86 
ρ(Pesticide,  2000)  0.0687 0.82 0.0366 0.41 
ρ(Pesticide,  2001)  0.2361 2.09 0.2287 1.92 
ρ(Labor, 1997)  0.0201  0.29  -0.0183  -0.24 
ρ(Labor,  1998) 0.0367 1.80 0.0344 1.50 
ρ(Labor,  1999)  -0.0742 -2.37 -0.0643 -1.87 
ρ(Labor,  2000)  -0.0058 -3.52 -0.0054 -2.99 
ρ(Labor,  2001) 0.1606 1.95 0.1593 1.76 
ρ(Bean revenue, 1997)  0.9675  1.07  0.9865  1.12 
ρ(Bean revenue, 1998)  -0.1609  -0.34  -0.1424  -0.30 
ρ(Bean revenue, 1999)  0.0072  0.05  -0.0016  -0.01 
ρ(Bean revenue, 2000)  0.0025  0.01  -0.0250  -0.10 
ρ(Bean revenue, 2001)  0.0156  6.54  0.0091  4.16 
ρ(Corn revenue, 1997)  -0.3872  -0.66  -0.3400  -0.60 
ρ(Corn revenue, 1998)  0.7040  1.13  0.6446  1.06 
ρ(Corn revenue, 1999)  0.3147  0.93  0.1361  0.41 
ρ(Corn revenue, 2000)  0.0200  0.19  0.0244  0.23 
ρ(Corn revenue, 2001)  -0.0364  -0.21  -0.0468  -0.28 
*Time dummy variables and interaction terms available upon request. 
Table 7. Input Factor Demand and Factor-Output price Elasticities (Standard 
Errors) 
 -----------------------------------------------With  Payments-------------------------------------------- 
 Fertilizer  Pesticide  Labor  Land  Corn  Soybean 
Fertilizer -0.8257  0.1269  0.1782 0.5206 2.2291 1.5026 
  (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0060) (0.0440) 
Pesticide  0.1140 -0.8121 0.1610 0.5371 2.2096 1.5102 
  (0.0027) (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0054) (0.0396) 
Labor 0.1905  0.1646  -0.8557  0.4735  2.2423  1.4974 
  (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0011) (0.0032) (0.0064) (0.0471) 
Land  0.1477 0.1697 0.1256 -0.4430 2.0921 1.5563 
  (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0017) (0.0125) 
  ------------Difference (With Payments Elasticity – Without Payments Elasticity)*------------- 
Fertilizer -0.0074  0.0004  -0.0018 0.0088 0.1992 0.2039 
Z-scoreÆ  (-4.01)  (0.13) (-0.70) (3.08) (33.36) (4.64) 
Pesticide 0.0004  -0.0035  -0.0021  0.0052  0.2002  0.2028 
Z-scoreÆ (0.13)  (-2.54) (-0.81) (2.38) (37.35) (5.12) 
Labor  -0.0020 -0.0025 -0.0005 0.0050 0.1985 0.2047 
Z-scoreÆ  (-0.70) (-0.81) (-0.49) (1.55) (31.11) (4.35) 
Land 2.5E-03  0.0017  1.3E-03  -0.0055  0.2063  0.1962 
Z-scoreÆ (3.09)  (2.37)  (1.55) (-17.02)  (122.04)  (15.70) 
*Critical values for Z-scores: 1.96 and 2.58 for 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 26 
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